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MONEY SANCTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
IN A COMMUNIST ECONOMY
BERNHARD GROSSFEIDt
THE Western jurist with a civil or common law background approaching for
the first time the contract law of a communist country, is inclined to assume that
liability for damages for breach of contract, if it exists at all, cannot be of any
great importance. The economy in these countries is almost completely central-
ized; all economic activity, indeed every business transaction, is governed by the
"plan," and all enterprises of any importance are property of the state. The
Western observer generally will be surprised to learn that an elaborate system of
contracts governs the relations between the state-owned enterprises. We tradi-
tionally connect the notion of contract with a free economy, based on private
property, individual activity, and competition. But even more striking is that
liability for damages is of central importance under the contract law of a com-
munist nation. For we would frequently think that contractual obligations be-
tween state-owned enterprises in such an economy would be enforced only by
such public measures as police action and criminal punishment. Moreover, we
are accustomed to take for granted that the main purpose of money remedies for
breach of contract is to compensate injured parties and to deter contractual
parties from breaching. In an economy where all the main enterprises are state
property, however, it seems inconceivable that the main purpose of remedies for
breach of contract could be the compensation of losses. The payment of damages
from one state-owned enterprise to another can result only in transfer of the
financial resources of the state from one organ to another. Why, then, intro-
duce money damages for breaches of contracts, with all the difficulties arising
when they are claimed and with all the institutions necessary for their settlement
or enforcement? How can a system of contractual liability for damages work
effectively in a communist economy? What can be its purpose? What are its
peculiarities and effects?
The contract law of East Germany offers a good opportunity to examine
these questions, since that state now has a completely centralized economy based
on state-owned enterprises. The observations here reach far beyond East Ger-
many, however, providing a key for a better understanding of similar questions
in all European countries under communist control, because the contractual
systems of all these countries are at present in nearly the same stage of develop-
ment.'
I. THE SYSTEM OF CONTRACTS IN EAST GERMANY
The East German law of contracts is now regulated by the Statute on the
System of Contracts in the Socialist Economy (Statute of Contracts) of
tThis article was prepared with the helpful guidance of Professor Kazimlerz Grzy-
bowski of the Yale Law School and was inspired by an unpublished seminar report of Miss
Ingrid Sydow at the University of Miinster, Germany.
1. Drobnig, Der Vertrag in einer plangelenkten Staatswirtscl1, 15 JuiasTENznTuNa
233, 240 (1960).
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December 11, 1957.2 More than half its 97 sections deal elaborately with the
contractual responsibilities of the parties and the remedies for breach of con-
tracts, thus indicating by sheer volume the paramount importance of con-
tractual responsibility. By far the most important sanctions for breach of con-
tract are monetary damages and penalties.3
This system of contract law is the final result of a development which started
in 1945, when East Germany fell under Soviet domination. Immediately after
the Soviet occupation a completely centralized and planned economy was intro-
duced. The economic goals set forth in the plan were executed exclusively by ad-
ministrative, bureaucratic means. Every business transaction was regulated by
special administrative directives in which all particulars were meticulously
fixed.4 This system worked satisfactorily to a certain extent, but only so long as
the economy as a whole was not too complicated and differentiated. With the
growth of the economy, the slowly rising standard of living, and the complexity
of industrial and consumer demands in the modem industrial age, other methods
of economic ordering and regulation became necessary. Thus, in accordance with
previous experiences in the Soviet Union,5 a system of contracts was introduced
at the end of 1951.6 This change was the expression of a certain decentralization
and an attempt to give some scope to individual initiative. The experiences of
this early stage of the contract system ultimately led to the promulgation of the
Statute of Contracts.
It is impossible within the scope of this article to describe in detail the func-
tions and the position of contract in a communist economy. It is, nevertheless,
necessary to deal briefly with the relationship between plan and contract, as
this relationship is the basis for the functioning of the system of contracts.
The plan holds a central position in the East German economy. It expresses
the governmental economic policy and fixes, with the help of binding direc-
tives, the course of the country's economic development.7 The function of the
contract, in turn, is to implement in detail the directives of governmental policy
as expressed in the plan.8 The introduction of the system of contracts is de-
signed to eliminate from the plan those specifications which are important only
2. Gesetz fiber das Vertragssystem in der sozialistischen ,Virtschaft (Vertragsgesetz)
vom 11. Dezember 1957. [1957] 1 Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Dernokratischen Republik 627
(Ger. Dem. Rep.). [Hereinafter cited as Statute of Contracts].
3. PAx Z , Din VERAxTWORTLrcHKE1 FOR DRrrE Lx DEN VmnRAGSVznXLTNmSSEN
ZWvISCHEN SOZIALISTISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSORGANISATIoNEN 45 (Deutsches Institut far
Rechtswissenschaft, Schriftenreihe Zivilrecht, Heft 9, 1958).
4. Drobnig, supra note 1, at 233. SPrrZNER & P~AzmE, ZUR WV1rscArnSLrrNDF
TTrGXE DES STAATLICHEN VRTRAGSGERICHTS 14 (1961).
5. SPrrzNR & PAziz, op. cit. supra note 4, at 12.
6. Verordnung fiber die Einfiihrung des Allgerneinen Vertragssystems ffir Waren-
lieferungen in der volkseigenen und der ihr gleicbgestellen Virtschaft vom 6. Dezember
1951 [Regulation concerning the introduction of a general system of contracts ... ]. [1951]
Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1141 (Ger. Dem. Rep.).
7. BRATus & LuNz, FRAG-N DES NVIRTSCHAFrsvERTRAGES 10 (Deutsches Institut ffir
Rechtswissenschaft, Schriftenreihe Zivilrecht, Heft 6, 1956).
8. Gazysowsia, Sovrnr LEGAL IxsnTu'IoNs 87 (1962).
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between a particular purchaser and a particular sellei, as, for instance, the
precise date of delivery, or the particular type, quality, and packaging of the
goods.9 Moreover, the contract serves as a means for disclosing mistakes and
errors in the general planning and permitting their correction. 10
The most important state organ in the administration of the system of con-
tracts is the "State Contract Court," which resolves disputes arising out of
contractual arrangements."' Since conflicts are handled in nonadversary pro-
ceedings and decisions are called "awards of arbitration"1 2 controversy still
exists as to the fundamental nature of the contract court. In section 1(1) of
the legislative decree concerning the contract court the court is identified as a
"central organ of governmental administration." It is apparently for this rea-
son that all commentators agree that the designation "court" is misleading.
Some authors 13 deny completely its character as a court. Notwithstanding
these controversies, unanimity exists as to its main purpose: Its task is to
lead and educate the socialistic economy by means of its decisions. 14 The con-
tract court plays an affirmative role in representing the interests of the state,
beyond the mere interests of the parties involved, during each proceeding. In
the process, it locates the source of error that led to the breach, proposes
measures to prevent further breaches, and, in addition to rendering an opinion,
may even organize an exchange of experiences with other enterprises." More-
over, the court continually observes the effectiveness of the contract system as
a whole so that it is in a position to make proposals for improvement. 10
II. THE EcoNoMIc BASIS OF CONTRACTUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DAMAGES
The introduction of the system of contracts in 1951 was closely connected
with a fundamental change in the status of the state-owned enterprises in
their relation to the state and to each other. This change, in the official East
9. BArTus & LUNz, op. cit. supra note 7, at 8; Drobnig, supra note 1, at 234-35;
HEMMERLING, VERTRAGSPFLIC3T UND VERTRAGSABSCHLUSS IM VERTRAGSGESLrTZ 22-23
(1958).
10. BRaTus & LUNZ, op. cit. supra note 7, at 11; Drobnig, supra note 1, at 236,
11. Verordnung iiber das Staatliche Vertragsgericbt (Vertragsgerichtsverordnung)
vom 22. Januar 1959 [Regulation concerning the State Contract Court]. [1959] 1 Gesetzblatt
der Deutschen Demokratiscben Republik 83 (Ger. Dem. Rep.). The State Contract Court
consists of the Central State Contract Court (Zentrales Staatliches Vertragsgericht) as the
court of last resort and the District Contract courts (Bezirksvertragsgerichte). The pro-
cedure is regulated by the Verordnung fiber das Verfabren vor dem Staatlichen Vertrags-
gericht (Vertragsgericbtsverfahrensordnung) vom 22. Januar 1959 [Regulation concern-
ing the procedure before the State Contract Court]. [1959] 1 Gesetzblatt der Dcutschen
Demokratischen Republik 86 (Ger. Dem. Rep.).
12. "Schiedssprfiche."
13. SPITZNER & PANZER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 40; comitra, Dornberger, Zur uirt-
.schaftsleitenden Tditigkeit des Stuatlichen Vertragsgcrichts, 11 STAAT UND RECUT 1091, 1100
(1962).
14. Klinger & Panzer, Zur wirtschaftsleitenden Tditigkeit des .Staatliclhe Vertrags.
gerichts mid ejinge Fragen der sozialistischen Bewusstseinsbildung, 9 STAAT UND RECtIT
459, 461 (1960); cf. 5 DAS VERTRAGSSYSTEM 89, 90 (1961).
15. SPITZNRM & PANZER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 34-35.
16. Id. at 36.
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German terminology, is described as the introduction of the "principle of
economic accounting."17 Every state owned enterprise now has the duty to
work profitably within the framework established by the plan and in accord-
ance with the economic goals it sets forth. Every enterprise has to maintain
its own accounts showing gains and losses. For this purpose all enterprises
have been equipped with separate assets and money.18 Thus enterprises have
become comparable-at least to a certain extent-to independent privately-
owned enterprises. The principle of economic accounting is generally held to
have been the decisive step in establishing contractual liability for damages
as a means of "control through the Mark."19 The policy behind this innovation
was that a higher overall efficiency of the economy could be achieved only by
giving each state-owned enterprise a greater independence and by making it
responsible for its operations. But the new concept of the socialistic enterprise
as an independently operating, externally responsible economic unit, it was be-
lieved, could be successful only if the workers in the enterprise had an in-
terest in its success. Thus the "principle of matErial interest"20 was introduced
alongside the principle of economic accounting. This label describes an at-
tempt to set up a system of economic incentives for the directors, employees,
and workers of the enterprise. This was tried originally by the introduction
of the "director's fund,"21 which was designed to permit participation by the
members of the enterprise in its financial success. Into this fund went a certain
percentage of the profits the enterprise made through overfulfillment of its
plan.2 The director's fund has since been replaced by the "enterprise premium
fund,"' 3 which has a similar function. Each year a sum amounting to up to
6.5% of the total wages planned for that year 24 can be paid into the fund.2
The amount actually paid in depends upon how the enterprise performed dur-
ing the year under the plan and how much "profit" it earned. The fund itself
17. "Prinzip der wirschaftlichen Rechungsfiihrung." It was introduced by the
Verordnung fiber Massnahmen zur Einfihrung des Prizips der wirtschaftlichen Rech-
nungsffihrung in den Betrieben der volkseigenen Wirtschaft vom 20. AfSrz 1952 [Regulation
concerning measures for the implementation of the principle of economic accounting...].
[1952] Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 225 (Ger. Dem. Rep.).
18. SprrzNxa & PANZFR, op. cit. supra note 4, at 12.
19. Id. at 11.
20. "Prinzip der materiellen Interessiertheit." Id. at 12.
21. "Direktorfond," introduced by the Verordnung fiber die Bildung und Vervendung
des Direktorfonds in den Betrieben der volkseigenen ,Virtschaft im Planjahr 1952 vom 25.
Mirz 1952 [Regulation concerning lhe establishment and use of the director's fund ...
[1952] Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 229 (Ger. Dem. Rep.).
22. Regulation concerning the establishment and use of the director's fund..., mipra
note 21, § 3.
23. "Betriebsprdmienfond," introduced by the Verordnung fiber den Betriebsprimien-
fonds sowie fiber den Kultur- und Sozialfonds in den volkseigenen und ilmen gleichgestellten
Betrieben vom 11. Mai 1957 [Regulation on the enterprise premium fund... ]. [1957] 1
Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 289 (Ger. Dem. Rep.).
24. "geplante Jahreslofinsumme.".
25. Regulation on the enterprise premium fund . .. , mpra note 23, § 10. For more
technical details, see _Pflicke, Materielle- Interessietrng und maerielle Verantworlug, 1
DAS VERTRAGSSYSTEM 1 (Heft 2, 1957).
132919631
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
is earmarked for distribution among members of the enterprise according to
their individual performance,2 0 generally by awarding prizes to outstanding
directors, technical personnel, foremen, and workers for innovations and sug-
gestions for improvements.27
The fact that the amount available for the enterprise premium fund depends
on the profits of the enterprise is the cornerstone for the effective functioning
of contractual liability for damages, since damages caused by a breach of
contract diminish the profit of the injured party and proportionally decrease
the means available to the fund. This detrimental influence on the gains of the
enterprise and its premium fund can be compensated through the payment of
a certain amount of money by the responsible enterprise, restoring the profit
to the original level. Such payment simultaneously reduces the gains of the
responsible enterprise and the amount available for its premium fund. Thus,
the adverse consequences fall ultimately on the enterprise responsible for the
breach. In this manner the money sanctions for breach of contract acquire real
meaning.28
III. THE PURPOSE OF DAMAGES AND PENALTIES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
The foregoing discussion seems to indicate that there is no great difference in
the purpose of money sanctions for breach of contract between a civil or common
law system, and the East German system. In both cases they serve to com-
pensate losses. But this compensatory function does not have the same para-
mount importance in East Germany as it has in a western economy.
In a communist economic system the payment of damages can by no means
compensate completely" the damage incurred. The damage to the society as a
whole, for example, cannot be compensated, °2 for every breach of contract dis-
turbs a certain established pattern and demands an increased effort to over-
come its consequences and to re-create order. The liquidation of the damages
absorbs additional energy and time which could have been better used-if the
damage had not occurred- for constructive activity.80 Moreover, the goods
which could not be produced as a result of the breach of contract are missing
in the final balance of the plan, or can be produced only at the expense of
other goods. The fact that these arguments might equally be given in a western
legal system throws some doubt on the contention that the most important
goal of the money sanctions for breach of contract is compensation; the rele-
vance of these arguments is at least not restricted to the law of a planned com-
munistic economy.31 But there is another-I am inclined to say "unique"-
26. Regulation on the enterprise premium fund..., supra note 23, § 20.
27. Regulation on the enterprise premium fund..., supra note 23, § 21.
28. Pflicke, Materielle Interessierung und Sanktionen, I DAs VERTRAGSSSTEM 5
(Heft 3, 1957).
29. PANZER, op. cit. mpra note 3, at 17.
30. Ibid. See also CHALFINA, WESEN UND BEDEUTUNG DES VERTRAGES XM SOW-
JETISCHEN SOZIALISTISCHEN ZMLRECHT 21-22 (Deutsches Institut ffir Rechtswissenschaft,
Schriftenreihe Zivilrecht, Heft 8, 1958).
31. Cf. GRoss zLn, DiE PravATSTRAFE 76 (Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung, 1961),
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feature in a communist economy that makes compensation itself virtually im-
possible-the existence of a comprehensive plan by which the economy is
ruled. In a free, competitive economy, with free access and exchange of goods,
nearly every good can be evaluated and replaced by a certain amount of money.
Consequently, in such an economic system a purchaser whose supplier breaches
a contract can generally purchase the same goods from another supplier, pro-
vided the damages he sustained are compensated. Thus in our western legal
systems a purchaser very often does not have a vital interest in the specific
performance of the contract; whether he receives from the seller the goods he
wanted or their money value may make little difference to him. This is not the
case in a completely planned economy where there does not exist a free flow of
goods available on the open market. If one particular producer or supplier fails
to perform his contractual duties there are no others to whom the buyer can
turn. Money, therefore, is no equivalent for the product itself. Thus the tasks im-
posed upon the enterprise by the plan cannot be accomplished when the enter-
prise receives money instead of the goods it needs for production, and from this
this it follows that in such an economy actual performance of every contract is of
greatest importance. 2 This "principle of specific performance"3m is the basic
principle of the communist system of contracts. It represents the categorical
demand of the law that the goods which are to be delivered must not be replaced
by money damages. 34 Thus even an express agreement betveen the parties to a
contract concluded under the plan that specific performance will be waived in
favor of an equivalent in money is void.3 5 The money compensation is conceived
exclusively as an "emergency measure," 30 a "last resort" when specific perform-
ance is virtually impossible.37
These unique features of the economic system demonstrate that the main
purpose of the money sanctions for breach of contract cannot be compensation
for losses. Rather, the emphasis shifts to prevention of losses or "education." s
The main task of money sanctions becomes the enforcement of contractual dis-
cipline,39 for the understanding is that the more difficult it is to compensate dam-
age the more must be done to prevent it. The money sanctions serve their pur-
pose best, therefore, when they prevent occurrence of a breach of contract.40
When a party does fail to perform the contract and has to pay damages, they
32. CHALFn=A, op. cit. supra note 30, at 21; 1 GEzNEi, BRArus, Luxz & No%%zin,
SOwJ.TSCHES ZIVuILECHT 493 (1953); Knapp, Das Problem der so9cla nnticf rcalen
Erfiillung, 9 NrTuE Jusriz 463 (1955); PA.xzEa, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 17; Reimers,
Ober die Gefdhrdung der Vertragserfillung und iiber das nltirk:ende Versclulden in,
Allgemeiten Vertragssystem, 7 NuE JusTrIz 486, 489 (1953).
33. 'Trinzip der realen Vertragserfifilung"; literally, "principle of actual fulfillment."
34. Knapp, supra note 32, at 464-65.
35. Ibid. 1 GaxlNm, BRAxus, Luxz & Nowzma, op. cit. supra note 32, at 495.
-36. 1 GENEI=, BRATus, Luxz & NowlzxI, op. cit. supra note 32, at 493.
37. Ibid.
38. Pflicke, mpra note 28, at 5; PANZERz, op. cit. supra note 3, at 17-18.
39. Knapp, supra note 32, at 465.
40. Pfiicke, Zu den subjektiven Voraussetzungen der wechselsoitigen materiellen
Verantwortlichkeit der sozialistischen Betriebe, 6 DAS VmRTRAGssYsrtmL 225, 226 (1962).
19631
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
function as a "form of social criticism," 4' as a means of "education through the
Mark."42 Simultaneously, of course, there is a compensatory effect, 43 but, in
direct contrast with the Western systems, compensation is warranted only if it
can serve an educational purpose.44 Moreover, the effects of the money sanction
go far beyond the particular contract in question, because the contract and the
plan stand in very close nexus. Through the contracts the necessary combina-
tion between the central direction of the economy by the state and the economic
independence of the enterprises is realized.4 When concluding contracts within
the framework of the plan, each enterprise determines the precise content of its
share in the implementation of the plan.4 6 The contract is thus a means of eco-
nomic planning,47 an instrument by which the purposes of the state can be real-
ized.48 Compensation for damages, then, is not paid for the benefit of the injured
party, but constitutes an attempt by the state to use the individual interest as
a tool to achieve social control, to secure the fulfillment of the plan, The party to
the contract who sues for damages fulfills a "public" task; his own interest is
satisfied only where it serves the greater goals of the society.
IV. THE PECULIARITIES OF DAMAGES AND PENALTIES FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT
A. The Fault Principle
Liability is based on the fault principle.4 9 Section 37(1) of the Statute of
Contracts is merely declarative of the mutual responsibility of the parties for
the performance of their contractual duties. But section 37(2) 60 adds that,
41. See Judgment of March 28, 1960, Zentrales Staatliches Vertragsgericht, 4 DAS
VERTRAGSSYSTEm 216,217 (1960) (Ger. Dem. Rep.).
42. See Pflicke, supra note 28, at 5; cf. Judgment of Sept. 7, 1959, Bezirksvertragsgericht
Dresden, 3 DAs VERTRAGSSYSTEm 383 (1959) (Ger. Dem. Rep.).
43. Spitzner, Die inaterielle Verantwortlichkeit der Betriebe fir ihre Kooperations-
verpflichtungen, 6 DAS V-RTRAGSSYSTEM 193, 195 (1962); Panzer, Verschuldets ist
Voraussetizung fiir die vertragliche Verantwortlichkeit, 6 DAS V RTRAGSSYSTEM 196, 197
(1962).
44. Mitteilung des Zentralen Staatlichen Vertragsgerichts Nr. 44/59 yom 14. Oktober
1959 zur Anwendung der §§ 37 und 38 Abs. 1 Vertragsgesetz [Opinion of the Central Con-
tract Court concerning the application of §§ 37, 38(1) of the Statute of Contracts], re-
printed in SPITZNER & PANZER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 181, 182.
45. SPITZNER & PANZER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 13.
46. Such, Das Vertraogssystem--Instrument der Staatlichen Leifung zur Envicklung
der Initiative und der Tatkraft der Volksmassen, 3 DAs VERTRAGSSYSTEm 257, 259 (1959),
47. SPrTZNER & PANZER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 14.
48. Ibid. Such, supra note 46, at 259.
49. PANZER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 34; Pflicke, supra note 25, at 3.
50. Statute of Contracts § 37:
(1) Die Vertragspartner sind einander fuir die Einhaltung der Verpflichtungen aus
dem Vertrage verant:wortlich.
(2) Der Schuldner wird von der Verantwortlichkeit befreit, wenn er nachwelst, dass
die Nichterffillung oder nicht gehbrige Erffillung durch Umstande bedingt ist, die
er nicht abwenden konnte. Dieser Nachveis ist ausgeschlossen, sowelt in den folgen-
den'Bestimmungen festgelegt ist, dass der Schuldner in bestimmten Ffillen von der
Verantwortlichkeit nicht befreit wird.
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except in situations which are subsequently enumerated in the statute,51 the
defendant is relieved from all liability when he proves that the breach of con-
tract was caused by circumstances "which he could not avoid." Whether the
failure of performance is caused by negligence or by an intentional act is ir-
relevant.52
The introduction of the fault principle was not achieved without dispute.
In Soviet jurisprudence there had been a tendency to call the fault principle
"bourgeois" and "unsocial," without any value in a socialist civil law.rm Conse-
quently, in 1951, when the system of contracts was first introduced, it was pro-
vided that the obligation to pay penalties or damages should arise regardless of
whether there was fault by the defendant5 4 But only a few weeks later the
fault principle was introduced,55 and the traditional arguments favoring strict
liability were rejected.
One such argument reflected the usefulness of the money sanction as an in-
dicator of breaches of contracts and thus as a means of centralized state con-
trol. This worked as follows. In East Germany the state-owned enterprises do
not have the right to effect direct financial transactions among themselves.
Every payment has to be effected through the central bank, the "Deutsche
Notenbank." The transfer of a penalty or of damages from the account of one
enterprise to that of another signals the breach of contract and the bank can
inform the competent authorities.50 Strict liability operates as the most ef-
fective indicator because it signals to the authorities every disturbance in
the performance of the plan by a corresponding "automatic" financial transaction.
At least in theory this is so, and originally the theory may have worked quite
well. But with the steadily rising number of financial transactions, the super-
vision of all accounts became far too costly,57 and thus had to be replaced with a
more efficient form of control.
Another argument in favor of strict liability, which found strong support in
the discussions before the final draft of the Statute of Contracts, was that strict
liability is an excellent means for tracing all injurious consequences of a breach
back to the enterprise in which the first cause intervened. Not only can the
decisive first cause easily be detected, but the entire amount of damages which
this first mistake caused by its impact on other enterprises at successive stages
of production can be measured.58 But this argument, too, did not prevail, for
it was feared that the causal principle would create an enormous task for the
51. See text at notes 71-92 infra.
52. Panzer, supra note 43, at 200.
53. PANzER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 32.
54. Drobnig, Der Vertrag it eiter plangelenkten Staatswirtschaft, 15 JunxsTrNzrw.c
233, 238-39 n.62 (1960).
55. Ibid.
56. Id. at 234; PANZER, DIE VERAxrwoarLrcunErr ra DarrE IN DEN VEiRTAsVwa-
HALTNISSEN ZWISCHEN SOZLUIsTISCHEN ,VIRscHAFTSORGANXSATIoNFN 45 (1958). SeC
generally SAMsoN, GRUNDZOTGE DES MITTELDEUTSCREN VIRscHAFTSREciHTS 114-15 (1960).
57. Drobnig, supra note 54, at 237.
58. Freytag, Die Grundsitze der materiellen Veranlworllichkelt hin Entwurf der ncten
Vertragsaerordnung, 10 NEuE JusTiz 204, 205 (1956).
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administrators and courts,59 and would lead to a tremendous burden in the
basic materials industry, in which the first cause generally would appear. And
here the breach would very often be due to factors that could not be avoided.00
Moreover, it was successfully argued in opposition to strict liability that the
preventive and educational purpose of the money sanctions would be frustrated
if an enterprise were held responsible for an act or failure that it could by no
means avoid. Instead of fostering the energy and initiative necessary to over-
come the difficulties that led to the breach, such a policy would promote in-
difference, since even the most diligent efforts would be without any influence
on liability.61
Thus the attempt to assure a high educational effect for money sanctions is
observable throughout the provisions of the Statute of Contracts. The general
tendency is to make the responsibility as severe as possible within the frame-
work of the fault principle. This tendency is reflected dearly by the measure
of care which is required from every enterprise in the performance of its con-
tracts. The standards for testing whether a breach of contract was avoidable
are extremely rigorous. Rather than relating to the abilities of the particular
individual or enterprise in question, they are objective standards 0 -the ob-
jective demands of commerce. 63 It is not the "reasonably prudent man" who
serves as the "objective" standard in a case involving an individual but the
worker in a socialist enterprise displaying the greatest success in producton.04
As to the responsibility of the enterprise, the standard requires a duty to make
the utmost efforts and to display the highest possible concern for the fulfill-
ment of the contract. A maximum exertion by the enterprise, 3 even an
extraordinary effort, 66 is necessary, and this effort is evaluated from the stand-
point of the society and its objective needs.0 7 Thus, for instance, an enterprise
cannot contend as a defense that its technical equipment does not meet the
present high standards of technology and science.08 The defendant is relieved
from liability only when the breach is traceable to "unavoidable forces" or
when the injured party himself was the cause. An "unavoidable force" 0 is
59. PANZER, op. cit. supra note 56, at 33.
60. Id. at 33-34. But the idea of tracing back the avalanche of damages to its starting
point was not completely abandoned. As will be seen later, it reappeared in a somewhat
mitigated form under the guise of another legal device-liability for third persons.
61. HEMMER1LING, GRUNDFRAGEN DES VERTRAGSSYSTEMs 77-78 (1958), cited in Hof-
mann & Schneider, Book Review, 3 DAs YERPTPAGSsysTER 52, 54 (1959) ; PANZMR, op. cit.
supra note 56, at 33; Pflicke, supra note 25, at 2.
62. PANZER, op. cit. mupra note 56, at 35-36.
63. Id.at 35.
64. Ibid.
65. Pflicke, supra note 40, at 230, giving several examples.
66. Pflicke, Materielle Interessierung 14nd materielle Verantwortung, 1 DAS VERTRAGS-
SYSTF- 3 (Heft 2, 1957).
67. PANZER, op. cit. supra note 56, at 36.
68. Judgment of June 4, 1959, Zentrales Staatliches Vertragsgericht, 3 DAs VERTRAGS-




defined in section 40 as an event that was unpredictable and could not be avoid-
ed either by the defendant or by others even through the taking of all precau-
tionary measures which correspond to the latest knowledge of technology and
science.70
B. The Main Extensions of the Fault Principle
There are, however, a few sections of the statute that outwardly, at least,
give the appearance of imposing strict liability. The most important is section
38(1),71 according to which the defendant cannot be released from liability
when the breach of contract was caused by circumstances within the enter-
.prise 72 or by the organization of the enterprise for the implementation of the
plan.73 This may be the case when a machine becomes defective or when other
technical difficulties occur which are not of a completely extraordinary charac-
ter.74 The same is true when the enterprise fails to hire the workers it needs
to filfill its contractual duties.7
The liability imposed by section 38(1), however, is doctrinally not regarded
as strict liability, since this would be inconsistent with the educational concept
of contractual liability. Instead, section 38(1) is construed as creating a con-
clusive presumption of fault.76 This interpretation is justified by the argument
that fault is generally involved whenever a breach of contract is caused by an
event within the sphere of the enterprise. Moreover, it is argued that outsiders
could not realistically be expected to determine whether an enterprise has de-
ployed all its energy and engaged all its reserves to avoid a technical break-
down.7 7 Finally, the presumption of fault may induce the enterprise to take the
utmost care and foresight to avoid technical disturbances or to overcome their
consequences.7"
70. Statute of Contracts § 40.
71. Statute of Contracts § 38(1).
72. "Umstande des betrieblichen Geschehens." Ibid.
73. "Organisation der Planerfiifung." Ibid.
74. PANrzE, op. cit. .unpra note 56, at 43; Pflicke, .rupra note 66, at 4-5.
75. This latter rule is tempered only by such extraordinary circumstances as a shortage
of labor caused, for example, by a suddenly occurring flu epidemic. This limitation fits well
into the general rule that the enterprise is responsible only for disturbances which must be
reckoned with in the usual course of events, PAZFzR, op. cit. supra note 56, at 43, and which
can, at least theoretically, be influenced by the efforts of the enterprise. SPrrzxER & PAnzEi,
ZuR wIRTscHAFTsLErENDEN TTIGKEIT DES STAATLICHEN VEinRAGSGEcCnTs 35 (1961).
Thus, the responsibility stipulated in section 38(1) finds its limit where the "unavoidable
force" begins. Pflicke, supra note 66, at 5. As to the severity of this responsibility and the
restricted interpretation of "unavoidable force," cf. Judgment of Jan. 12, 1959, Regierungs-
vertragsgericht 3 DAs VERTRAGSSYSTEm 90-91 (1959) (Ger. Dem. Rep.).
76. Drobnig, supra note 54, at 238; HmuAmiLTNG, oP. cit. supra note 61, at 96, 98-99,
cited in Hofmann & Schneider, supra note 61, at 54.
77. Pflicke, supra note 66, at 4.
78. Drobnlig, mupra note 54, at 238; PAZER, op. cit. supra note 56, at 43.
1963] 1335
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
This interpretation of section 38(1) shows that the fault principle in the
system is based on the assumption that every mistake--except those stemming
from "unavoidable forces" 79--c be avoided and that every mistake that
can theoretically be avoided must be avoided in practice. It goes without saying
that this axiom and the demand drawn from it do not correspond to reality,
and that very often the liability for breach of contract becomes strict liability
in practice. The line between liability based on fault and strict liability in this
system is by necessity very thin, and the dilemma it creates seems insoluble.
On the one hand standards must be very high, bordering on strict liability, be-
cause there should be an inducement to exercise the utmost care. On the other
hand this borderline must not be crossed, lest the educational purpose be
frustrated. Yet the law creating such a dilemma seems itself unavoidable by
the very nature of the basic economic system. The plan establishes a highly
complicated system which is very sensitive to every disturbance. Even slight
disarrangements can have serious consequences on the economy as a whole.
Unlike a free, competitive economy where the risk is divided among many
independently-operating, self-adjusting economic units, a completely planned
economy does not have great elasticity, no "built-in buffers" which alleviate
and limit losses. That is why the utmost care to avoid even minor failures is
necessary. Only an 6lite is capable of meeting these demands; the average
man with his mistakes, his deficiencies and his lack of social discipline has no
place in this system. But this is only one side of the coin. The law cannot dis-
regard completely the fact that most people are near average. There is a broad
gap between the ideal, conceived as the standard, and reality. This gap must be
closed by education or even stronger pressures, and the larger the gap the
stronger must be the pressure to close it. Such pressures raise the danger,
however, that people withdraw into resignation. Thus, ironically, the high
standard of care which is indispensable to produce the necessary educational
effect may be at the same time the greatest obstacle to its attainment.
The struggle to find a way between the Scylla of strict liability and the
Charybdis of too low a standard of care can be seen in the difficulties that arose
out of the relation of section 37 (the fault principle) to section 38(1) (con-
clusive presumption of fault). In the first year after the introduction of the
Statute of Contracts the lower courts relied heavily on section 38(1), so
that in practice the fault principle seemed to be abandoned. This practice
simplified the task of the contract courts, because it enabled them to avoid ex-
amining defendants' claim that the mistake could not have been avoided under
the given circumstances.80 It thus represented an avoidance by the courts of
their basic duty to the State to identify the source of errors and to stimulate
the discussion and adoption of corrective measures-the "educational" purpose
of the Statute of Contracts and the contract courts. This practice produced a
growing indifference toward the possibilities of corrective action among the
79. See note 75 supra.
80. Cf. Heuer & Pflicke, Zu den Au!fgaben der Rechtswissenschaft bci der Verbesse-
rung der Zusammenarbeit der Betriebe, 4 DAs VERTRAGSSYSTEm 204, 209 (1960).
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enterprises against whom the decisions were rendered.8' Finally, therefore,
the Central State Contract Court intervened in 1959, declaring the extensive
application of section 38(l) to be inconsistent with the main policy underlying
contractual responsibility for damages, and directing that its application be
restricted to exceptional cases.82 In the year following this opinion, section 37
formed the basis of decision in 87.8% of all cases in which contractual liability
for damages was the main issue, and section 38(1) in only 12.2%.8 It is
doubtful, however, whether the new directive represents a substantial change
in the degree of ultimate responsibility of enterprises breaking contracts,84
since the contract courts are always free to apply section 38(1) after they find
section 37 inapplicable. Nonetheless, the new development does at least repre-
sent a clear attempt to require the contract courts to locate the source of mis-
takes and explore ways of preventing them-thus assuring the performance of
their educational tasks in the field of contractual responsibility.8,
Another deviation from the fault principle is section 38(2), according to
which the defendant is not relieved of liability if the breach of contract is
caused by lack of money. It would seem that the lack of other resources caus-
ing a breach would be treated similarly, but it is not. The lack of other re-
sources is excused because other resources are not at the free disposal of the
enterprise in a planned economy.80 Although this is true also of money, its
lack is uniquely regarded as conclusive evidence that, in the long run, the
enterprise will not work efficiently to meet the standards of the plan, regardless
of whether it has committed particular mistakes.8s The lack of money, then,
is conclusively presumed to be caused by fault. ss
Finally, section 38(3) provides that the defendant is responsible if the
breach of contract is caused by the unilateral directive of a superior administra-
tive organ. This provision appears somewhat surprising, since the enterprise
is legally bound to comply with the order, even if it results in a breach of con-
tract.89 But its effects are offset by a requirement that the organ issuing a
unilateral directive reimburse the enterprise for damages it had to pay.00 The
81. Klinger & Panzer, Zur wirtsclaftsleitenden Tdtigkcit des Staallichen t'ertrags-
gerichts und ejinge Fragen der sozialistischen Bewusstseinsbildung, 9 SrTAA UND RrwnT
459, 466-69 (1960) ; see also Artzt, Die Vcrwirkliclung der Vcrantwortlichheit des sozial-
istischen Industriebetriebes, 11 STAAT UND Rc1T 489 (1962).
82. Opinion of the Central Contract Court concerning the application of §§ 37, 38(1)
., supra note 44.
83. Data from Spitzner, supra note 43, at 196.
84. Cf. Hofmann & Schneider, supra note 61, at 54.
85. See SprrzNER & PA zER, op. cit. supra note 75, at 32-35.
86. See PANzrEz, op. cit. supra note 56, at 91.
87. Pflicke, supra note 66, at 5; PANZER, op. cit. supra note 56, at 39.
88. Drobnig, supra note 54, at 238. Cf. Judgment of Oct. 17, 1956, Zentrales Staatliches
Vertragsgericht, (Ger. Dem. Rep.), cited by PANZER, op. cit. supra note 56, at 39 n.123.
89. See Pflicke, supra note 66, at 6.
90. The methods of how this compensation is effected are emxtensively discussed in
,Vege, Zum fitnaziellen Ausgleich bei einseitigen Weisungen, 3 DAs VETlRAGssYsrU 304
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purpose of the rule thus is to assure that no agency of the government will
issue directives without first examining the detrimental effects upon the indus-
tries subject to it-and receiving the cooperation of other governmental or-
gans.91 This represents, of course, another example of how the device of con-
tractual damages is used as an instrument to attain an overall public goal
deemed desirable.9 2
C. The Liability for Members of the Enterprise and Other Third Parties.
Section 5 13 provides that the enterprise is liable for the acts of all its mem-
bers in the preparation, execution, and performance of contracts which result
in a failure to conclude the contract within the time prescribed by the plan or
generally in a breach. We are accustomed to view a rule like this as creating
vicarious liability-liability for the acts of others. But such is not the opinion
in East Germany. There the fault of every director, employee, and worker is
regarded as the fault of the enterprise itself. Thus the collective interest in
the profits of the enterprise-through the enterprise premium fund-is sup-
ported by a notion of collective responsibility, based on the following theory:
the socialist enterprise is-according to a definition now generally accepted in
East Germany 94-"a collective of workers and employees with a responsible
leader at its top, which the state has organized and to which it has delegated
the performance of certain of its tasks ... ." From this concept of a socialist
enterprise stems the notion that the workers cannot be regarded as separate
legal subjects vis-d-vis the enterprise, while performing their duties within it.05
It is only through the combined activities of these workers that the enterprise
comes to act as a unit and as a legal personality bearing responsibility for the
injurious acts of its members. 6 Moreover, the words "in the performance
of the contract" are broadly interpreted. Every act of a worker or employee
even indirectly connected with the performance of a particular contract thus
falls within the scope of section 5.97
(1959). See also Greiner, Die Verantwortlichkeit kotmequent durchsetelt, 6 DAs VERTIRAGS-
SYSTEM 239 (1962).
91. See Pflicke, supra note 66, at 6; Drobnig, supra note 54, at 238.
92. Cf. text at notes 38-48 supra.
93. Statute of Contracts § 5:
Verantwortlichkeit des Betriebes fiir Handlungen seiner Mitarbeiter.
Die Handlungen aller Mitarbeiter des sozialistischen Betriebes bel der Vor-
bereitung der Vertragsabschliisse, dem Abschluss der Vertrige und der
Vertragserfillung bergriinden bei Verletzung vorvertraglieher und vertrag-
licher Pflichten die Verantwortlichkeit des Betriebes.
94. Panzer, Verschulden ist Voraussetizung fflir die vertragliche Verantwortlichkeit, 6
DAS VERTRAGSSYSTEM 196, 200 (1962).
95. Ibid.
96. PANZER, DIE VERANTWORTLICHKEIT FUR DRITTE IN DEN VERTRAGSVERiALTNISSN
ZVISCHEN SOZIALISTISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSORGANISATIONEN 68 (Deutsches Institut filr
Rechtswissenscbaft, Schriftenreihe Zivilrecht, Heft 9, 1958).
97. See Judgment of May 24, 1960, Zentrales Staatliches Vertragsgericht, 4 DAS
VERTRAGSSYSTEm 252,253 (1960) (Ger. Dem. Rep.).
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Sections 39(1) and 39(2) 9s also provide responsibility for the acts of third
persons, far beyond that previously known in German law. It renders the en-
terprise liable for the acts of all persons or enterprises with which it cooperated
to prepare or perform the contract. For example, section 39 would render an
enterprise liable for a breach brought about by the shortcomings of its sup-
plier. The most notable aspect of the provision, however, is that it applies
only where the third party can be identified 09 and is itself liable to the de-
fendant ;100 thus it creates liability only where the total damages ultimately can
be placed upon the enterprise originally responsible.10 1 This restriction demon-
strates quite clearly the view that all contracts between socialist enterprises are
but a part of an overall plan, toward the fulfillment of which all enterprises
must cooperate.
This interrelationship between the plan and particular contracts is stressed
by the "principle of comradely cooperation," 102 expressed in section 4:
The socialistic enterprises are to cooperate as comrades in the prepara-
tion, conclusion, and performance of contracts. Each partner is obligated
to assist the other partner in the performance of the contract and thus in
the implementation of the plan, and must always have regard for the
consequences of his own conduct for the fulfillment by the other partner
of his responsibilities under the plan.L03
This principle is applied in the field of contractual responsibility by requiring
the enterprise originally causing the breach to answer not only for the damage
caused to the immediate partner but also for the further damage caused be-
cause the injured party in turn could not perform its own contractual duties
98. Statute of Contracts § 39:
Verantwortlichkeit fair Dritte.
(1) Wird die Nichterfifillung oder nicht geh~rige Erfifllung von einem Dritten
verursacht, fur dessen Verhalten der Schuldner den Glfiubiger gegenilber
einzustehen hat, so wird der Schuldner von der Verantwvortlichkeit nur befreit,
venn weder er gem.ss §§ 37 und 38 noch der Dritte gem.ass §§ 37 bis 39
verantvortlich ist.
(2) Soweit gesetzliche Bestimmungen nichts anderes vorschreiben, hat der
Schuldner fdir das Verhalten des zur Vorbereitung oder Durchfiihrung des
Vertragserfiillung herangezogenen Dritten gegeniiber dent Gl.ubiger dann
einzustehen, wenn der Dritte, der die Nichterfifung oder nicht geh0rige
Erffilung verursacht hat, feststellbar ist....
99. Statute of Contracts § 39 (2).
100. Statute of Contracts § 39(1).
101. Thus the statute adopts the suggestion in Artzt Zur materiellen Verantwortlichhdt
bei Schadensverursachung int Vertragsrecht, 9 NEuE JusTrz 367, 369 (1955).
102. "Grundsatz der kameradschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit"
103. Statute of Contracts § 4:
Grundsatz der Zusammenarbeit.
Die sozialistischen Betriebe haben vor und bei dem Vertragsabschluss und
bei de Vertragserfifillung kamaradschaftlich zusammenzuarbeiten. Jeder Part-
ner ist verpflichtet, dem anderen Partner bei der Vertragserfiillung und damit
bei der Planerfifillung behilflich zu sein und stets die Aus,,ir.ungen sdnes
Veraltens atif die Planerfililung des anderen Partners cu berich.ichlign.
(Emphasis added).
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to another enterprise. All enterprises thus are admonished to be aware of the
consequences of their mistakes upon the economy as a whole, lest they be re-
quired to pay greatly accumulated damages with their harsh effects upon
profits. It is this result, especially, that is deemed to make contractual liability
for damages a very efficient weapon for enforcing contractual discipline.104
The defendant enterprise, however, is prohibited by section 82 from taking
recourse against the original party if it could have prevented the original
failure. 105 The purpose of this restriction is to encourage a purchaser, for ex-
ample, to police its supplier in order to prevent any wasteful breaches.100 It
clearly reflects a policy of requiring intense cooperation between the enterprises
and a nearly complete synchronization of their respective activities.
D. Penalty Provisions
Before the passage of the Statute of Contracts, there existed penalty pro-
visions in the East German laws, but they were independent of damages. When
a breach of contract occurred, the injured party obtained the penalty plus com-
plete compensation.10 7 This former concept of the penalty had one very un-
desirable aspect: the enterprise that got the full amount of damages in ad-
dition to the penalty was better off when its partner did not perform the con-
tract than when the contract was fulfilled. Thus, it was not always induced to
assure performance of the contract on behalf of its supplier.108 The penalty
provision, therefore, could produce satisfactory results only so long as there
was strict state control against abuses. When this control weakened and gave
way to the principle of a decentralized control of the enterprises by each other,
however, the dangers inherent in this concept became more apparent. Instead
of serving as an instrument to enforce the fulfillment of contracts, it operated
as a temptation to speculate on a breach of contract. A recognition of this led
to the present statute, in which the penalty is merely a standardized form of
damages for which it is not necessary to prove that injury has occurred or
the amount of the damages.10 The decisive distinction is that the plaintiff can-
not claim in addition to the penalty the full amount of damages, and that he
has the burden of proof in claiming damages.' 10 Moreover, to prevent an abuse
of the penalty provision by the plaintiff, the contract courts even have the
power to reduce the amount of penalties and damages in exceptional cases." 1
104. PANZER, op. cit. mpra note 96, at 83-84.
105. Statute of Contracts § 82(3).
106. Artzt, supra note 101, at 370; PANZER, op. cit. supra note 96, at 150.
107. PANZER, Op. cit. supra note 96, at 46.
108. Cf. CHALFINA, WESENT UND BEDEUTUNG DES VERTRAGES IM SOWJET1ScU1N
SOZIALISTISCHEN ZIVILRECUT 21 (Deutsches Institut fiur Rechtswissenschaft, Schriftenreilhe
Zivilrecht, Heft 3, 1958) ; Pflicke, Materielle Interessicrung und Sanktionca, 1 DAs Vz-
TRAGSSYSTEm 5 (Heft (1957). Under the system prevailing prior to the Statute of Contracts,
however, such multiple damages were in fact collected only infrequently. Drobng, supra
note 54, at 239.
109. Statute of Contracts § 35 (1) ; PANZER, op. cit. supra note 96, at 46.
110. Statute of Contracts § 81(2).
111. Statute of Contracts § 83.
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Nevertheless, the penalty is in practice the most important remedy for
breach of contract. The statute enumerates the cases in which a penalty is to
be paid, including all sorts of delays, lack of quality, insufficient packaging, and
complete failure of performance, although the parties also have the right to
stipulate penalties for other violations of contractual duties.'
With the weakening of the concept of centralized state control, the penalty
underwent another substantial alteration. Before the Statute of Contracts, the
enterprises were obligated to claim all penalties," 3 and the defendant en-
terprise was not entitled to set up a counterclaim against it." 4 This was the
result not only of the educational function of the penalty but also in part of the
idea that the penalty was a means of centralized state control. Only when
every penalty was successfully claimed, and its payment made through the
central bank, could every breach of contract caused by fault be detected. This
rigid construction of the penalty, however, has now been somewhat liberalized.
Today the enterprises have a high degree of freedom to decide whether or not
they want to sue for the penalty. Nevertheless, there still are some cases in
which the enterprise is obliged to claim the penalty. Section 79(1) establishes
this duty when the delivered goods did not correspond to the stipulated quality,
type, and packaging, and when it is expressly provided in other statutes. In all
other cases the enterprise has to consider carefully whether the educational
purpose of the penalty requires that it be claimed.'15 Abuses of the discretion-
ary power of the enterprise are prevented by the right of the contract courts
to initiate an investigation against enterprises that fail to claim penalties in
violation of the law,"16 and the enterprise can be punished by a fine up to
5,000 Deutsche Mark for repeated violations." 7 Moreover, because of the
strong public interest in the penalty, any agreement by the parties not to
claim it or to stipulate either a higher or lower penalty than the statute pro-
vides is void,' 8 and all enterprises must account separately for the amount of
damages and penalties paid."19
112. Statute of Contracts § 35(2).
113. Hemmerling, Zun Inkrafllreten des GeseLt es fiber das Verlragssystem int der
sozialistischen Wirtschaft, 1 DAS VERmAGssYsEMi 1, 5 (Heft 6, 1957). Cf. Pflicke,
Materielle Interessierung und inaterielle Verantworl9ng, 1 DAs VERrAGssvsrEmt 1 (Heft 2,
1957).
114. Drobnig, .supra note 54, at 234.
115. Zentrales Staatliches Vertragsgericht, Grundslitzliche Feststellung Nr. 4/59, cited
in Hentschel, Der Schuhgrosshandel nutkt das Vertragssyslem nur mangelhiafl, 4 DAS
VERTRAGssysM 82 (1960). Cf. Statute of Contracts § 79(3). See generally Hemmerling,
supra note 113, at 5.
116. Verordnung fiber das Staatliche Vertragsgericht (Vertragsgerichtsverordnung)
vom 22. Januar 1959 [Regulation concerning the State Contract Court] § 11(1) (2). [1959]
1 Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 83 (Ger. Den. Rep.).
117. Regulation concerning the State Contract Court, stpra note 116, § 14(2).
118. Judgment of Nov. 25, 1959, Zentrales Staatliches Vertragsgericht, 4 DAs
VERTRAGSsYSM 91 (1960); Klinger, Zur HThe der Veriragsstrafe, 3 DAs V=Mnr ns-
sYsrE= 375 (1959).
119. Hesse, Vertragsstrafen und Schadenersatk imi Rechnungswesen auximisen, 5 DAs
VERT AGSsYsTEm 340 (1961).
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Since the effects of a money sanction are greater the sooner it is claimed and
executed, the penalty provision is ideal. Its amount is fixed in advance by the
statute, and a short, quick procedure is available because no injury need be
proved. Furthermore, the statute itself encourages a prompt payment: the
plaintiff has to claim the penalty within one month, 120 or, in particular cases,
within two weeks.121 If the defendant wants to deny his responsibility, this
must be done within another month ;122 otherwise he is deemed to have ad-
mitted liability. 23 Finally, payment of the penalty is made easy because all en-
terprises are subject to the so-called "bill collection procedure."1 24 When the
debtor is deemed to have admitted liability, the amount of the penalty is
transferred by the "Deutsche Notenbank" from his account to the account of
the creditor without any further procedure.125 Thus a claim for penalties
generally can be settled within two months.
V. PRESENT PRACTICES AND TENDENCIES
To determine whether the actual effects of the damage provisions in the
Statute of Contracts square with the theory is rather difficult, primarily be-
cause of the scarcity of statistical data. Nevertheless, some general indications
do exist.
All commentators who discuss contractual responsibility agree that the
money sanctions for breach of contract have not yet satisfactorily fulfilled the
functions which they were thought to serve.1 2 0 Lengwinat expressed in 1959
the still unanimous opinion "that the sanctions do not exert the leverage which
is theoretically ascribed to them."'1 7 The status of contractual discipline is
therefore still unsatisfactory. 128 In 1961, for example, approximately 6,000,000
120. Statute of Contracts § 77(1).
121. Statute of Contracts § 77(2).
122. Statute of Contracts § 78(1).
123. Statute of Contracts § 78(3).
124. "Rechnungseinzugsverfahren," regulated by the Anordnung iber die Verrechning
von Geldforderungen durch Rechnungseinzug (RE-Verfahren) vom 24. Juni 1957 [Direc-
tive concerning the crediting of money claims through the bill collection procedure]. [19571
2 Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 229 (Ger. Dem. Rep.).
125. SAmsoN, GRUNDZiOGE DES MITTELDEUTSCHEN WlRTSCrsAPTSRECTS 114-15 (1960).
126. Heuer, Demokratischer Zentralsinus und so'ialistische Moral, 4 DAS VE RTAGS-
sYsiEm 99, 104 (1960); Hildebrandt, Unsere hohen Vcrtragsstrafen--n ernstes Signal, 5
DAS VERTRAGSSYSTEm 250 (1961) ; Leng-winat, Zur Verantwortlichkeit f ir Drilte, 3 DAS
VERTRAGSSYSTEM 133, 136 (1959); Panzer, Die Anwendung des Vertragssylstems als
sozialistischer Leitungsinethode durch die 5rtlichen Slaatsorgane lind die Au!gaben der
Bezirksvertragsgerichte, 11 STAAT UND REdcr 1080, 1083, 1087 (1962); Pflicke, Die
Bedeutung des sozialistischen Bewusstseins und der materiellen Interessierihel bei der
Bekiimpfung von Vertragsverletziongen, 4 DAS VERTRAGSSYSTEM 161, 167 (1960) ; Spltzner,
Zur Entwicklung des Vertragssystems und zur Verbesserung der Arbeil des Staallicheit
Vertragsgerichts, 4 DAS VERTRAGSSYSTEM 195, 196 (1960).
127. Lengwinat, supra note 126, at 136. "Bekannt ist, dass die Sanktionen nicht die
Hebelwirkung ausiiben, die man ihnen abstrakt-theoretisch zuschreibt." Quoted with ap-
proval in Heuer, supra note 126, at 104.
128. Spitzner, Die inaterielle Verantwortlichkeit der Behriebe fir ire Kooperations-
verpflichtungen, 6 DAS VERTRAGSSYSTEM 193, 194 (1962).
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Deutsche Mark were paid as penalties. Considering that the amount of
penalties does not exceed 6%o of the value of the goods, 30 these 6,000,000
Deutsche Mark must represent many breaches. The main obstacle to the
effective working of the system seems still to be the computation of the
enterprise premium fund. Money sanctions are very often only one factor
among many that affect the profit of the enterprises,13 ' and several of the
factors frequently counterbalance each other.132 Without going into these
technical and economic factors,133 suffice it to mention that an extensive in-
vestigation of the Central State Contract Court in 1962 led to the conclusion
that the sanctions for breach of contract had an insufficient influence on the
enterprise premium fund ' 34 and that in only a few enterprises did the penalties
have any appreciable effectY33
But these technical deficiencies are not regarded as crucial or insuperable.
The main difficulties arise on a much more substantial level. It is a widespread
practice that enterprises do not claim penalties even when they are obliged
to do so. The reason seems to be that they do not want to disturb their good
will relations with the members of other enterprises or cut off a major source
of aid -when they themselves are in embarrassing circumstances. 30 Thus only
a few enterprises actually sue for damages beyond the amount of the penalty,' 37
regardless of the prospects for success. Moreover, it is commonly acknowl-
edged that the penalties and damages are regarded as a mere "financial mat-
ter," like other general business expenses, which generally are handled by the
firm lawyers and accountants. 13 Indeed the other members of the firm may not
even be aware of the payment,139 let alone moved to take corrective action.14 0
Realization that the contract system does not yet work satisfactorily has led
to an extensive discussion during recent years, especially 1962, apparently in-
dicating another shift in the concept of the penalties and damages. The princi-
129. Panzer, supra note 126, at 1087; cf. Hildebrandt, supra note 126, at 250-51.
130. Statute of Contracts § 36(1). The value corresponds to the legally imposed price.
Judgment of June 24, 1959, Zentrales Staatliches Vertragsgericht, 3 DAS VERTRAGSSYSTU
252 (1959).
131. For a discussion of other factors see Otto, Die [Virksamkeit von Vertragsstrafe
und Schadenersats erhhen, 6 DAS VERTRAGSsYsTEM 204, 205 (1962).
132. Pflicke, supra note 126, at 167.
133. For further details see Hesse, supra note 119, at 340-41; Somnmer, 1'erlragsstrafen-
Sclladenersatzforderungn umtd inaterielle Interessiertheit, 4 DAs VTr AssysrEm 84, 85
(1960).
134. Panzer, Versclulden ist Voraussetkung ffir die vertragliche VeranhtLorllichkCit,
6 DAS VEaRTAGssYsTEM 196, 197 (1962).
135. Otto, supra note 131, at 205.
136. For a thorough examination see Adamczek & Alt, Missv'erstandenze kameradschalo-
liche Zusammenarbeit, 4 DAS VFRTRAGssYsTE 69, 70 (1960).
137. Kleine, Der Schadenersatz in Verfahren vor dent Staalieen Vertragsgerieht, 6
DAs VERTRAGSSYSTEm 201 (1962).
138. Panzer, supra note 126, at 1087; Hildebrandt, mipra note 126, at 250; Spitzner,
supra note 126, at 196.
139. Cf. Heuer, supra note 126, at 104.
140. Spitzner, s-pra note 126, at 196.
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ple of material interest is increasingly regarded as insufficient to achieve the
desired results. The main criticism is that it shows only an individual worker
the immediate consequences of his failure, but demonstrates no more far-
reaching political consequences to the society as a whole.141 Furthermore, it is
suggested that there can be no automatic "moral" effect from the money sanc-
tions so long as they refer only to a "material interest.1 42 The hope is that
"education through the Mark" can be turned into an ideological education,143
whereby the breach of contract tends not to be a mere economic matter, but
instead becomes a "matter of honor," a "moral question. 1 44
The most controversial point of discussion at the moment is the fault princi-
ple. While certain authors still adhere to it as the basis of contractual responsi-
bility,145 another very influential group favors a change,140 feeling that the
fault principle as it now exists merely encourages the enterprises to seek de-
fenses against their liability 147 and to emphasize their individual abilities over
the overall goals of the plan. The question, as the critics see it, is whether it
is possible to find a principle of responsibility that does not presuppose fault
but has, nevertheless, an educational effect.1 48 One notable commentator sug-
gests that the decisive criterion for imposing liability in the absence of fault
should be whether a modification of the practice is necessary and can be ac-
complished by the action of the defendant enterprise.14 The needs of the
society and objective standards are thus the only relevant factors, and in-
dividual abilities are disregarded completely. Whether these proposals will be
successful is not yet clear, but they are the main topics of discussion, and have
already given rise to a pending motion to reform the statute in the Counsel of
Ministers of East Germany.15 0
CONCLUSION
When we evaluate the system of money sanctions for breach of contract as
a whole, the interrelation with its economic basis, the economic necessities, the
underlying policies, and the technical devices, it seems clear that it is a highly
logical construction. Logical clarity, indeed, seems to be the most distinguish-
ing technical feature of communist legal institutions. They are not drawn from
historical experience, but intellectually conceived, purportedly with no am-
141. Heuer, supra note 126, at 104-05; Pflicke, supra note 126, at 167.
142. Heuer, supra note 126, at 104.
143. Pflicke, supra note 126, at 167.
144. Id. at 165.
145. Kleine, supra note 137, at 202; Panzer, supra note 134, at 199.
146. Heuer & Pflicke, Zu den Aufgaben der Rechtswissenschaft bei der Verbessenring
der Zusammenarbeit der Betriebe, 4 DAs VERTRAGSSYSTzm 204, 209 (1960) ; Pfllcke, Zu
den subjektiven Voraussetzungen der wechselseitigen maleriellen Verant'wortllchkeil der
sozialistischen Betriebe, 6 DAS VFRTMAGSSYSrTFMX 225 (1962) ; Spitzner, supra note 128, at
196.
147. Spitzner, supra note 128, at 196; cf. Pflicke, supra note 126, at 167.
148. Pflicke, supra note 146, at 228.
149. Id. at 228, 233.
150. Spitzner, supra note 128, at 193.
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biguities, irrationalities, contradictions, and ancient relics. They result from the
precise translation of basic economic and philosophical principles into legal
terms, the perfect compliance of the law with the demands of a peculiar
economic system, which is in turn the result of a definite philosophical concept.
Together they form a dosed system of doctrines and thoughts, behind which
lurks the idea that there are no existential contradictions in life and society;
that an answer to every question can be found by logical operations. The
most obvious consequence of this structure of the lav is that we can trace
every legal provision right back to its ideological and economic roots, and
that by studying even the most technical fields of law we can quickly reach
basic political and philosophical principles. Every ideological change sooner
or later finds its expression in even the most remote legal provision. Thus, the
study of communist law is always at the same time a study of the communist
ideology.
Besides these, another feature of communist law stands out-the relation
between collective and personal responsibility. The idea of collective responsi-
bility is at the basis of the system of contracts, and is most dearly expressed by
the enterprise premium fund and the concept of the socialist enterprise. It is
the performance of the collective as a whole that determines the status of its
members. Every worker participates-at least in theory-in the success and
failure of "his" enterprise; his acts, in turn, have an immediate influence on
the status of his fellow worker, and vice versa. The opposition between man-
agement and workers and among the workers themselves seems completely
abolished; they all are submitted to the same social ain expressed in the plan,
and they all contribute equally to it, although in different functions. The same
is true of the enterprises among themselves. They are woven into a close net
of reciprocal relations, every enterprise being important only in view of the
overall output of all enterprises. But this concept of collective responsibility is
only one side of the picture, for combined with it is the highest possible notion
of personal responsibility, a categorical demand for the highest of human
values from each member of the collective. The collective system can work
satisfactorily only when it consists of men that develop their talents to the ut-
most, demand even the greatest exertions from themselves, but, nevertheless,
submit completely to the exigencies of the society. The man without fault,
without weaknesses, able to match every situation, who at the same time
identifies his interest with that of the nation and achieves the highest social
discipline 151 is the "Leitbild," the standard of this law. What we might con-
sider as the ideal-well knowing that we could never reach it-is here deemed
the standard, the type of man that must, and even more optimistically, can
be achieved. The concept seems to us to be that of a man who incorporates the
highest human values only to become a tool in the hands of society. But the
communist legal philosophers see no such contradiction. Their legal institutions
are based on the principle that personal interests always conform to those of
151. Cf. GRzvowsix, Sovier LEGAL INsTioTU Ns 110-18 (1962).
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society.15 2 The lav of money sanctions for breach of contract is a superb example
of the practical consequences of this basic principle.
But even the communist legislator cannot avoid recognizing that there still re-
mains a wide gap between his concept of the ideal man, and man as he really is.
The final aim of the educational thrust 153 of the law is to close this gap-to
produce, ultimately, a new type of man, the "homo sovieticus," 154 who is
indispensable to the collective system as a whole.
152. SAMsoN, op. cit. supra note 125, at 118; see generally 1 GENi IN, BtTUs, LuNz
& NowizKI, SowJETISCES ZIVLRECHT 18-19 (1953).
153. As to this educational aspect of communist law, see GRZYBOWSKI, op. Cit. s1pra
note 151, at 118-29.
154. Id. at 110-18.
